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U.S. SUPREME COURT SIGN CASES

First, a couple of basic concepts: the commercial / noncommercial speech distinction, and the importance of ownership.

COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH

"Commercial speech" means regular advertising; debate in the marketplace of goods and services; the search for customers and clients. In contrast, "noncommercial speech" means debate in the marketplace of ideas and values; issue advocacy; the search for converts and supporters. Most noncommercial speech concerns the endlessly debatable topics of religion and/or politics. Under current doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court, noncommercial speech has a higher level of First Amendment protection than commercial speech. The reasons for this are mostly historical. Almost all state supreme courts interpret their constitutions in the same way, but a few–most notably Oregon–do not.

THE OWNERSHIP FACTOR

When the government regulates signs on private property, the private citizen has both the free speech right and the property right on their side. But when private signs are displayed on government property, then the property right is on the government side of the equation. This changes the analysis about whether the law is constitutional or not.

POLITICAL AND PROTEST SIGNS

Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). A public school district could not choose the subject of debate on picket signs. A law allowing labor protest but prohibiting all other types of messages was unconstitutional.
READ THE DECISION HERE

POLITICAL SIGNS, FREE SPEECH AND THE LAW: a comprehensive survey of the court decisions on the constitutionality of local laws regulating political / campaign / election signs.
MORE INFO

Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). A political candidate wanted to buy advertising space inside public transportation vehicles. The city refused to accept the ads. Their policy stated that only commercial and public service ads were accepted. The Court upheld the city's policy, partly on the government's ownership right (4 votes), partly on protecting a captive audience (1 vote).
READ THE DECISION HERE

City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). Political advertisers challenged city rule prohibiting all signs on utility poles and guy wires. The city law was valid. Just because some public property is desirable as a place for communication does not mean the government must open it to private parties.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). Law enacted by Congress, forbidding signs disrespectful of foreign governments, within 500 feet of any embassy, was unconstitutional.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). State law banning electioneering and signs within 100 feet of polls on election day was valid, justified by state interests in preventing election fraud and intimidation (4 votes) and because the polls were not traditional public forums (1 vote).
READ THE DECISION HERE

U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983): Law enacted by Congress, prohibiting demonstrations on the sidewalks around the U.S. Supreme Court building, was unconstitutional. Sidewalks are "traditional public forums" where, by long cultural tradition, people have expressed their views.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988): City law prohibiting "focused picketing" in residential neighborhood was valid as necessary to protect residential privacy. The case arose out of protest pickets outside the home of a doctor who performed abortions.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). State law made it illegal, within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility, to knowingly approach within 8 feet of another person, without consent, to pass leaflets or handbills, or to display a sign. The law was constitutional; it was content neutral and had not been adopted because of governmental disapproval of any particular message.
READ THE DECISION HERE

RESIDENTIAL SIGNS

Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994): City law which had the effect of prohibiting a war protest sign in the window of a home was unconstitutional.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). City law which prohibited "Real Estate for Sale" signs in residential neighborhoods was unconstitutional. The prevention of "white flight" did not justify preventing signs in the one place where they would be most effective.
READ THE DECISION HERE

See also: Frisby v. Schultz, in the Political and Protest Sign cases section.

COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND BILLBOARDS

Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Though not a sign case, Central Hudson is important in the law of signs because it established the four part test for constitutionality of laws regulating commercial speech. The steps are: 1) Is the speech protected by the First Amendment? If it is false or misleading, or concerns illegal activity, it is not protected. 2) Does the regulation serve a substantial governmental interest? 3) Does the regulation directly advance the substantial governmental interest? 4) Is the regulation more restrictive than necessary to serve the governmental interest. (This last element, the "degree of fit" between means and ends was refined in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), to "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.")
READ THE DECISION HERE

Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). This is the most famous of all the sign cases. It is the Court's only modern case on regulation of billboards ("offsite advertising" or "general advertising for hire"). The case produced five different opinions, runs over 90 pages in the law books, and was decried as "a virtual Tower of Babel" by Justice Rehnquist. Scattered among these opinions were five or more votes (a majority of the 9 votes on the Court) for the following principles: Rule One: The government's interests in traffic safety and community esthetics are enough to justify a complete ban on offsite commercial billboards (seven votes). Rule Two: The government may not favor commercial speech over noncommercial (issue advocacy) (4 votes plus two concurring in result). Rule Three: The government may not favor particular types of noncommercial speech over other types of noncommercial speech (same vote count as Rule 2).
READ THE DECISION HERE

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). Massachusetts banned tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds, and regulated marketing and distribution methods for tobacco products. The Court held that most of the regulations were pre-empted by federal law, and that the remaining parts failed the "narrow tailoring" (fourth element) of the Central Hudson test.
READ THE DECISION HERE
[disclosure: Randal R. Morrison wrote a "friend of the court" brief for the American Planning Association in the Lorillard case.]

THE EARLY SIGN CASES

Here are short summaries of U.S. Supreme Court sign cases decided before the First Amendment was extended to actions of state and local governments (1920's), and then to commercial speech (mid-1970's).

Fifth Avenue Coach v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911). A city law forbidding advertising trucks in Manhattan did not violate a coach [bus] company's property rights; those rights were defined by NY state corporate law, which said the company could use the public streets for transportation, but not general advertising for hire.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Thomas Cusack Company v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). A city ordinance, requiring consent of majority of residents before billboard could be placed in a residential neighborhood, was a valid exercise of the police power (the power to govern).
READ THE DECISION HERE

St. Louis Poster v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919). Billboards properly may be put in a class by themselves and prohibited in residential districts, in the interest of safety, morality, health and decency of the community.
READ THE DECISION HERE

Packer v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). There was no equal protection violation from a state law which made it a misdemeanor to advertise tobacco on billboards, even though such ads could be placed in newspapers and magazines. The decision emphasized protecting a captive audience.
Court decision: READ THE DECISION HERE

Railway Express Agency v. New York City, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). The Court refused to overturn the judgment of city officials who concluded that city's interests in traffic safety were served by regulation which banned advertising on vehicles but allowed advertising for the company which owned the vehicle. This case was decided after the First Amendment had been extended to state and local governments, but before the extension to commercial speech.
READ THE DECISION HERE

PRIVATE RELIGIOUS MONUMENT ON PUBLIC PROPERTY
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665, 555 U.S. 460 (Feb. 25, 2009). When the City accepted a private donation of a Ten Commandments monument, for permanent mounting in a city park, the monument became governmental speech. The City had no legal obligation to mount a religious monument offered by another religious group. READ THE DECISION HERE

REGULATION AND ANTITRUST

City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor, 499 U.S. 365 (1991). The power of the state, delegated to local governments, includes the power to displace competition, even in the outdoor advertising industry. A city cannot be held liable for anti-competitive acts for its billboard regulation policies.
READ THE DECISION HERE